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A SURVEY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW IN
ENGLAND: CRISIS? WHAT CRISIS?
Andrew Grubb*
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctor-patient relationship is a very special one.' As with many pro-
fessional relationships it is built upon a bedrock of mutual trust and respon-
sibility.2 But, unlike other such relationships, because the medical
profession is charged with the task of promoting health and not just financial
or other economic well-being, the integrity of the doctor-patient relationship
is especially important.
The importance of the relationship is recognized by the British Medical
Association in its Handbook of Medical Ethics, which states: "Good medi-
cal practice depends upon the maintenance of trust between doctors and pa-
tients . . . . [I]n this situation doctors must exercise great care and
discretion in order not to damage this crucial relationship."'
Nevertheless, even in a profession with the highest standards of ethical
conduct and care sometimes things do go wrong and patients suffer injuries.
This is not to suggest any particular weakness in the health care system or
medical education for as Donaldson, L.J., said in the Court of Appeal in
Whitehouse v. Jordan:
There are few professional men who will assert they have never
fallen below the high standards rightly expected of them. That
they have never been negligent. If they do, it is unlikely that they
should be believed . . . .If the judge's conclusion is right, what
distinguishes [the defendant] from his professional colleagues is not
that on one isolated occasion his acknowledged skills partly de-
serted him, but that damage resulted. Whether or not damage re-
* Assistant Lecturer in Law, Cambridge University and Law Fellow of Fitzwilliam Col-
lege. I am grateful to my colleagues Dr. D. Pearl and Mr. J.R. Spencer for their comments on
earlier drafts.
1. THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CIVIL LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL
INJURY 1 7054 (1978). (hereinafter "THE PEARSON COMMISSION REPORT"). The Commis-
sion observed that "Medical skill is exercised by one person on another, creating a special
relationship between the doctor and patient." I THE PEARSON COMMISSION REPORT at
1304.
2. Kenny v. Lockwood, (1932] 1 D.L.R. 507, 519-20 (Hodgins, J.A.).
3. BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, HANDBOOK OF MEDICAL ETHICS, 2.23 (1984).
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suits from a negligent act is almost a matter of chance and it ill
becomes anyone to adopt an attitude of superiority.4
II. "NO-FAULT" COMPENSATION
Patients injured by their doctor's conduct are compensated in England
without necessarily having recourse to litigation. For example, since Eng-
land has a welfare system, the injured can often obtain substantial social
security benefits.' Insurance coverage may also provide lost income and ex-
penses for the future. In addition, the National Health Service provides con-
tinuing free medical care for the injured.
Nevertheless, the majority of injured patients who are seeking substantial
sums as compensation will need to rely on the courts to award them dam-
ages. Litigation is arguably not the best way to provide compensation for
medical mishaps.6 Some would argue for an extended form of social security
payments, whilst others would support a system of centrally funded compen-
sation where the patient was not required to prove fault. In 1978, the Pear-
son Commission, which was established in 1973 to examine the extent of
civil liability and the provision of compensation for personal injury, pro-
duced a three-volume Report." The Pearson Commission accepted the view
that compensation through the courts was inappropriate for injury caused
on the roads.' Surprisingly, the Commission rejected this view for "medical
injury."9 Consequently, although the Commission recommended the crea-
tion of a statutory "no-fault" scheme for providing compensation for injury
caused on the road, it excluded cases of "medical injury" from its ambit.
The Commission also examined the possibility of the imposition of strict
liability within the present tort structure for "medical injury" but rejected
it,'0 with the exception of injury caused to volunteers in medical research
and clinical trials."
Apart from a few of its recommendations, 2 the Pearson Commission's
4. [1980] 1 All E.R. 650, 666.
5. See, P. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW, pt. 4 (3rd ed. 1980).
6. Haines, The Medical Profession and the Adversary Process, 11 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 41
(1973); cf Kretzmer, The Malpractice Suit: Is It Needed?, II OSGOODE HALL L.J. 55 (1973);
Linden, Tort Law as Ombudsman, 51 CAN. BAR REV. 155, 160 (1973).
7. See supra note 1.
8. 1 THE PEARSON COMMISSION REPORT 996 (1978).
9. The Pearson Commission defined this to include injury "caused by accident" which
itself could include "injury caused by professional negligence." I THE PEARSON COMMISSION
REPORT 1306-07 (1978).
10. Id. at 1 1338.
11. Id. at 1 1341.
12. See, e.g., the Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979 (compensation for injury caused by
vaccination); but see I THE PEARSON COMMISSION REPORT 1372-1413. For an analysis of
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Report seems destined to remain on a Whitehall shelf collecting dust.
Therefore, the Commission's negative attitude to malpractice claims will not
prove to be significant.
Nonetheless such a scheme might prove a better solution for medical mal-
practice victims than the predominantly litigation based system. Leaving
injured patients to the vagaries of negligence litigation in order to recover
damages to compensate them cannot be the most suitable way to deal with
this admittedly difficult problem. The New Zealand compensation scheme
set up under the Accident Compensation Act 1972 (as amended), 3 provides
a "no-fault" scheme for some medical malpractice cases, though its provi-
sions may be sadly deficient.
Under the Act any person who suffers "personal injury by accident" may
make a claim for compensation to the Accident Compensation Commission.
When a "no-fault" claim lies under the Act an individual's right to bring an
action in tort or contract in the courts is excluded. 4 "Personal injury by
accident" is defined to include "medical, surgical, dental or first aid misad-
venture",' 5 but not "damage to the body or mind caused exclusively by dis-
ease, infection or the aging process. '"16
Although the scheme provides a useful precedent for the "no-fault" ap-
proach to compensating medical malpractice outside the courts, as an exam-
ple which would be borrowed in England, it has its own problems of
interpretation which should be avoided if possible.' 7 Any potential English
scheme, though desirable, should avoid these if drafted with clarity. It
would then be easily comprehensible and not prove less effective than was
intended.
In not recommending a "no-fault" scheme for cases of "medical injury",
the Pearson Commission regarded the decision which they were called to
make a "difficult" one.'" The Commission observed that the "arguments
were finely balanced"' 9 for and against such a scheme. At the same time
they recognized that circumstances might change and that the progress of
the Vaccine Damage Payment Act see, Dworkin, Compensation and Payments for Vaccine
Damage, J.S.W.L. 330 (1979). For other minor enactments see, the Administration of Justice
Act of 1982.
13. Accident Compensation Act 1972, -N.Z. Stat.- (as amended). For a description of
the scheme see 3 THE PEARSON COMMISSION REPORT Ch. 10 and Harris, Accident A Compen-
sation in New Zealand: A Comprehensive Insurance System, 37 M.L.R. 361 (1974).
14. Accident Compensation Act 1972, §§ 5(1), 4(2) (as amended).
15. Id at § 2(a)(ii).
16. Id at § 2(b)(ii).
17. See Sutcliffe, Precedent and Policy in Accident Compensation, 7 NEw ZEALAND U. L.
REV. 305, 319-23 (1977).
18. 1 THE PEARSON COMMISSION REPORT 1370.
19. Id.
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the "no-fault" systems in other countries2' should be monitored. Judging by
the delay in enacting Pearson the time is plainly not ripe for the Government
to introduce legislation creating a "no-fault" scheme for compensating per-
sonal injury however caused. Nevertheless, in medical cases such a scheme
has merit independently of a more general scheme. It would remove the
stigma which is sometimes said to attach to a doctor who has lost a negli-
gence action.2' However false this may be22 the courts have encouraged the
misconception.23
In view of the Government's recalcitrance over Pearson, medical cases are
unlikely to be covered by their own unique scheme in the near future. How-
ever, in view of the difficulties an injured patient has in establishing a breach
of duty in a negligence action and, even if he can, establishing causation,24
the time may have come for a reappraisal of a "no-fault" scheme in this area.
Even though the arguments are "finely balanced", the scales seem to tip in
favour of a scheme if injured patients are to be properly compensated.
III. MALPRACTICE ACTIONS
2 5
In the absence of any compensatory "no-fault" scheme, injured patients
have frequently sued doctors seeking damages to compensate them for their
injuries. If a private patient is injured by his doctor, he may have an action
for breach of an express or implied26 contractual term.27 As is more usually
the case, the patient will be treated within the National Health Service and
then he will only have an action in tort because no contract can exist when
20. New Zealand and Sweden, for example, have "no-fault" systems.
21. Professional negligence, unless very grave, does not amount to "serious professional
misconduct", Medical Act 1983, s.36, so as to give rise to disciplinary proceedings before the
General Medical Council. See generally, A. WHITFIELD, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ch. 1 (J.
Taylor ed. 1980).
22. The real stigma is attached to peer rebuke. "It is no disrespect to Her Majesty's
judges to consider that their condemnation should disturb a doctor less than condemnation by
his professional bretheren." J. TAYLOR, THE DOCTOR AND NEGLIGENCE 1 (1971).
23. See, e.g., Hucks v. Cole, The Times, May 9, 1968, wherein Lord Denning, M.R.,
stated "A charge of professional negligence against a medical man was serious."
24. Peculiarly, the Pearson Commission thought that the difficulties of establishing causa-
tion militated against a no-fault scheme. 1 THE PEARSON COMMISSION REPORT 1364-69.
The very same problems arise in negligence litigation.
25. Grossen & Guillod, Medical Malpractice Law: American Influence in Europe, 6 B. C.
INT'L & COM. L. REV. 1 (1983).
26. The implied term is to "exercise reasonable care" in treating and diagnosing the pa-
tient equating with the standard of care in negligence. Occasionally a more onerous obligation
will be imposed. See, e.g., Thake v. Maurice, [1984] 2 All E.R. 513; cf Dendaas v. Yackel,
[1980] 109 D.L.R. 3d 455, 461.
27. See, e.g., Scuriaga v. Powell, 123 So. J. 406 (1979); Thake v. Maurice, [1984] 2 All
E.R. 513. A concurrent action in tort may also be brought. Edwards v. Mallan, [1908] 1 K.B.
1002; Batty v. Metropolitan Realisations Ltd., [1978] 1 Q.B. 554.
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the treatment has to be provided under a statutory obligation.2" In the latter
case, not only the doctor, who will usually be backed by his defense union,
but also the hospital where he works or the Health Authority,29 who are
vicariously liable for his negligence as his employer, 30 are sued.
As the Pearson Commission noted, the rate of success in such actions is
not as high as in other areas of negligence, some payment being made in only
30-40% of claims as compared with 86% of all personal injury claims.
31
The divergence in the figures may not, of course, be simply a function of the
courts' protective approach to doctors in medical malpractice cases. The
vetting of potential actions which takes place in practice by the medical de-
fence unions, 32 so that the worst cases of malpractice are weeded out in ad-
vance, and compensation paid, before they ever reach the stage of litigation
let alone the courts, probably has a significant influence upon the lower suc-
cess rate. Filtering alone is unlikely to produce such a large divergence.
Something else must be operating.
The English courts are uneasy when cast in the role of dispute settler be-
tween doctor and patient. But, as was recently stated: ". . . when there are
no alternative methods of resolving disputes between doctors and patients
the courts are bound to find themselves drawn into the act as mediators
in complex and freqently distressing matters. 33 Consequently the judges
have been asked to make decisions which they would prefer not to make.34
Even though actions in tort against doctors for negligently caused injury are
not uncommon,35 this cannot be compared with the "malpractice crisis"
which raged in the United States in the 1970s36 and resulted in near panic
amongst the medical profession along with a dramatic increase in profes-
sional insurance for the medical profession. As Lord Denning said in
28. See, Pfizer Corporation v. Ministry of Health, 1965 A.C. 512 at 536, 544 (House of
Lords).
29. Since 1954 an informal agreement, (Circular HM (54) 32), between the defence unions
and the Government has resulted in the damages awarded being shared by the authority and
the doctor's union. Quoted in THE DOCTOR AND NEGLIGENCE, supra note 21 at 120-22.
30. Gold v. Essex County Council, [1942] 2 K.B. 293; Roe v. Minister of Health, [1954] 2
Q.B. 66; Cassidy v. Ministry of Health, [1951] 2 K.B. 343.
31. 1 THE PEARSON COMMISSION REPORT at 1326.
32. The Medical Defense Union, The Medical Protection Society and The Medical and
Dental Defense Union of Scotland. For their history and functions, see generally - WHIT-
FIELD, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 21.
33. J. Mason & R. McCall-Smith, LAW AND MEDICAL ETHICS 11 (1983).
34. See, Whitehouse v. Jordan, [1980] 1 All E.R. at 661-62 (Lawton, L.J.).
35. But neither is the number too large. Under one thousand medical negligence actions
were filed in 1981. See ANNUAL REPORT, ACTION FOR VICTIMS OF MEDICAL ACCIDENTS
(1984).
36. See, SHAPIRO & WARIkEN, THE INFLUENCE OF LITIGATION ON MEDICAL PRACTICE
6, 23 (1977).
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Whitehouse v. Jordan: "there, the damages are colossal .... Experienced
practitioners are known to have refused to treat patients for fear of being
accused of negligence. Young men are even deterred from entering the pro-
fession because of the risks involved. . .,3" For a variety of reasons, as
we shall see later, England is, and probably always will be, a long way from
this position.
A patient injured by his doctor during a medical procedure has, at least in
theory, two potential causes of action against the doctor: an action in tres-
pass to the person or battery and an action in the tort of negligence.
(a) Battery
This action arises against a doctor when he carries out any medical proce-
dure which requires bodily contact with the patient and it is done without
the patient's consent or without lawful justification. 38
The law views the need for consent as essential to the lawful touching, by
a doctor, of a competent adult. In the Ontario case of Allan v. New Mount
Sinai Hospital, Linden, J., said: "While the courts resist advising the medi-
cal profession about how to conduct their practice, our law is clear that
consent of a patient must be obtained before any surgical procedure can be
conducted. Without a consent. . . no surgery may be performed.,, 39 The
need for consent in the medical context is derived from the individual's right
to decide what should be done with his or her body. In the same case the
judge said:
[Consent] is not a mere formality; it is an important individual
right to have control over one's own body, even where medical
treatment is involved. It is the patient, not the doctor, who decides
whether surgery will be performed, where it will be done, when it
will be done and by whom it will be done.4'
Whilst English courts have accepted the importance of consent, they have
restricted actions for battery based upon lack of consent to situations where
clearly no consent at all has been given to the medical procedure.4 Provided
the patient's consent is "real", in the sense that, "the patient [has been] in-
37. See supra note 34 at 658.
38. For cases which discuss this issue in the context of an emergency, see, Marshall v.
Curry, [1933] 3 D.L.R. 260 (Nova Scotia); Murray v. McMurchy, [1949] 2 D.L.R. 2d 442
(British Columbia). See generally, Skegg, A Justification For Medical Procedures Without Con-
sent, 90 L.Q.R. 512 (1974).
39. [1980] 28 Ont. 2d 356, 364, reversed on a pleading point, [1981] 33 Ont. 2d 603.
40. Id.
41. For an excellent, though slightly dated, account of doctors' liability for unauthorized
treatment, see, McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability For Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41
MINN L. REV. 381 (1957).
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formed in broad terms of the nature of the procedure" and has assented to
that procedure, the action cannot be brought.42 Thereafter, a failure to in-
form the patient of the risks inherent in the procedure will not give rise to a
battery action although, as we shall see, the patient may be able to succeed in
a negligence action.43 Failure to inform a patient of inherent risks in an
operation will only give rise to a battery action in case of deception or
fraud' or perhaps in cases of gross misrepresentation by the doctor.45
In cases where the wrong procedure is carried out where, for example, an
injection is given in the wrong arm, 6 or the operation is carried out by the
wrong person as, for example, where doctor "A" carries it out when only
doctor "B" has been given permission to operate,47 a battery action may be
brought. Further, the action will lie where no consent can be shown because
a wholly unauthorized operation is carried out, for example, when a sterili-
zation operation is performed (without permission) during an abortion"S or
where, during an operation on a toe, a spinal fusion is carried out.49
Of course, a court is likely to decide that medical procedures incidental to
the main operation are impliedly consented to by the patient and so no ac-
tion in battery will lie when they are carried out. No express consent is
needed for an anaesthetic to be used once a patient has consented to an oper-
ation because the former is "part and parcel" of the latter."° But it is un-
likely that the mere presence of a clause in a hospital consent form"' which
states that the patient "consents to such further or alternative operative
42. Chatterton v. Gerson, [1981] 1 Q.B. 432, 443 (Bristow, J.). The patient must be given
"enough time and an environment to enable him ... carefully to consider his.. . position."
Ferguson v. Hamilton Civic Hospitals 144 D.L.R. 3d 214, 248 (1983) (Krever, J.).
43. Chatterton v. Gerson, [1981] 1 Q.B. 432; Hills v. Potter, [1984] 1 W.L.R. 641;
Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hosp., [1984] 1 Q.B. 493 (Court of Appeals), [1985] 2 W.L.R. 480
(House of Lords). See also, Reibl v. Hughes, (1980] 114 D.L.R. 3d 1.
44. Sidaway. [1984] 1 Q.B. 493 at 511 (Sir John Donaldson M.R.); Reibl v. Hughes, 114
D.L.R. 3d at 11 (1980) (Laskin, C.J.); The Queen v. Clarence, [1888] 22 Q.B. 23; The Queen v.
Flattery, [1877] 1 Q.B. 410. In the criminal context of rape see, Regina v. Olugboja, [1982] 1
Q.B. 320.
45. Halushka v. University of Saskatchewan, [1965] 53 D.L.R. 2d 436 (Saskatchewan
C.A.) (experimental nature of the procedure was not disclosed).
46. Allan v. Mount Sinai Hosp., [1980] 28 Ont. 2d 356 (Ontario); Mulloy v. Hop Sang,
[1935] 1 W.W.R. 714 (Alberta).
47. Michael v. Molesworth, [1980] 2 BRIT. MED. J. 171. A court could easily decide that
a patient had impliedly consented to any one of the team carrying out an operation, and not
just a particular surgeon. Burk v. S., [1957] 4 W.W.R. 520 (British Columbia).
48. Cull v. Royal Surrey County Hospital, [1932] 1 BRIT, MED. J. 1195; Winn v. Alexan-
der, [1940] 3 D.L.R. 778.
49. Schweizer v. Central Hosp., 53 D.L.R. 3d 494 (1974).
50. Villeneuve v. Sisters of St. Joseph, 18 D.L.R. 3d 537, 552 (1971).
51. See generally, W. FARNDALE, LAW ON HOSPITAL CONSENT FORMS (1979); G.
SHARPE & G. SAWYER, DOcTORS AND THE LAW 48-53 (1978).
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measures or treatment as may be found necessary during the course of treat-
ment",5 or that a doctor "may carry out such additional or alternative oper-
ative measures as in his opinion may be found advisable"" will establish
consent unless the terms have been fully explained to the patient in advance
of the operation. In Chatterton v. Gerson, Bristow, J., said:
I should add that getting the patient to sign a pro forma expres-
sing consent to undergo the operation 'the effect and nature which
have been explained to me' . . . should be a valuable reminder to
everyone of the need for explanation and consent. But it would be
no defense to an action based on trespass to the person if no expla-
nation had in fact been given. The consent would have been ex-
pressed in form only, not in reality.
54
This statement, although made in the context of informing the patient of the
"nature" of the procedure, would, it is suggested, be equally apposite if a
court were deciding whether incidental procedures outlined in a consent
form had been consented to. Bristow, J., emphasized the "reality" of con-
sent and not the "apparance" of it. Therefore, although such forms may be
some evidence that a patient consented, they are not more than that. Con-
sent is a mental state of the patient and can only be present if the patient
actually possesses the knowledge which makes him understand the "nature"
of the procedure." Perhaps, because of the apparent carte blanche which
this type of clause gives the doctor, in addition the doctor should have to go
further and suggest to the patient the possible contingencies which might
arise before the doctor may rely upon the clause. In the United States,
clauses such as this have been held ineffective because of their vagueness.5 6
It is likely that an English court would scrutinize such clauses with extreme
care and would be likely to decide that they were ineffective except in the
circumstances outlined above.
The courts' reluctance to allow patients to bring battery actions against
their doctors, except in these clear cases, was emphasized by Hirst, J., in
Hills v. Potter. -7 His Lordship "deplored reliance on [assault and battery] in
medical cases. . . ." The reasons for this are not hard to see.
First, the battery action is an intentional tort usually reserved for hostile
action, something which is rightly seen as out of place in the usual medical
52. Medical Defense Union and Medical Protection Society, standard consent form as set
out in S. SPELLER, LAW OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT, appendix A (1973).
53. St. Joseph's Hospital, Toronto. Consent Form as quoted in A. LINDEN, CANADIAN
TORT LAW 63 (3rd ed. 1982).
54. Supra, note 42, at 443. See also, Casey v. Provan 11 D.L.R. 4th 708, 716 (1985).
55. See Sidaway, [1984] 1 Q.B. 493, at 499. (Lord Diplock).
56. Rogers v. Lumberman's Mutual, 119 So.2d 649 (La. 1960).
57. Supra, note 43, at 728.
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case." Secondly, the battery action affords the patient certain advantages,
which are not present if he is required to sue in the tort of negligence. For
example, if a battery action could be brought, once a patient had shown a
touching by the doctor as a result of the treatment or operation, the burden
would then pass to the doctor to prove consent.59 This shifting of the bur-
den of proof does not occur in a negligence action where the burden of proof
remains throughout the case upon the patient.' A shift in the burden of
proof would be a considerable advantage to a patient in his quest to win his
case. Also, as we shall see, the difficulty of proving negligence against a
doctor is great and, of course, in a battery action there is no need to do so -
the absence of consent suffices. Additionally, since there is no need in a
battery action to prove the often tricky element of causation61 the plaintiff in
such an action would have a significant advantage over his negligence coun-
terpart. Taken together the courts are reluctant to confer these advantages
upon a patient doing battle with his doctor in a malpractice claim.
(b) Negligence
Outside of the exceptional circumstances in which a battery action may be
brought an injured patient will have to rely on the tort of negligence. In
order to succeed the patient will have to prove, first, that the doctor owed
him a duty of care; secondly, that a breach of that duty has occurred and
thirdly that the breach caused him damage in the form of personal injury.
(i) Duty of Care
It is clear that a doctor owes a duty to his patient to exercise care when
treating him.62 As Lord Nathan said writing in 1957, "[t]he doctor's duty of
care is based simply upon the fact that the medical man has undertaken the
care and treatment of the patient.",
63
Until the enactment of the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act
58. Zimmer v. Ringrose, [1981] 4 W.W.R. 75, 79-80 (Prowse, J.A.).
59. Kelley v. Hazlett, 75 D.L.R.3d 536 (1976); Reibl v. Hughes, 114 D.L.R. 3d 1 (1980);
Schweizer v. Central Hosp., 53 D.L.R. 3d 494; Allan v. New Mount Sinai Hosp., [1980] 28
Ont. 2d 356; cf Freeman v. Home Office, (No. 2) [1984] 1 Q.B. 524, 537-39, 557 (McCowen, J.
and Sir John Donaldson, M.R.).
60. In Clark v. MacLennan, [1983] 1 All E.R. 416, Pain, J., held that once the plaintiff
showed a departure from accepted professional practice, the burden shifted to th defendant to
disprove negligence. This holding was again applied by Judge Pain in Wilsher v. Essex A.H.A.,
December 21, 1984 (unreported).
61. See infra note 82-104 and accompanying text.
62. Lanphier v. Phipos, 8 Car. & P. 475, 173 Eng. Rep. S 81 (C.P. 1838); R. v. Bateman,
94 L.J.K.B. 791 (1925).
63. LORD NATHAN, MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE (1957).
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197664 it remained uncertain under the common law6" whether a doctor,
inter alia, owed a duty of care to a baby in utero.66 The Act resolved the
doubt in favour of the existence of such a duty. 67 But this does not extend to
a duty owed to the baby to abort it if the doctor knows (or ought to know)
the baby will be deformed. In other words, the action for "wrongful life" is
not recognized by the Act,6 confirming the common law position in Eng-
land recognized by the Court of Appeal in McKay v. Essex A.-A. 69 but
perhaps not the emerging case law in America."° Little, if any, hardship is
caused by this if the parents have an action to recover the costs of bringing
up the deformed child and the two recent cases of Thake v. Maurice71 and
Emeh v. Chelsea and Kensington A.H.A. 72 show that in certain circum-
stances such an action for the emotional and financial loss caused by the
child's birth may exist in England. 3
It may be a difficult question to answer in some cases when exactly some-
one becomes a doctor's patient so as to trigger his legal duty to treat. It is
clear that a general practitioner within the National Health Service in Eng-
land is obliged to treat someone who is included, or has been accepted for
inclusion, on his "list" of patients, because of the doctor's contractual obli-
gation contained in the "Terms of Service" set out in the National Health
64. For an analysis of the Act, see Pace, Civil Liability for Pre-Natal Injuries, 40 M.L.R.
141 (1977).
65. The common law is examined by Lovell & Griffith-Jones, The Sins of the Fathers' -
Tort Liability for Pre-Natal Injuries, 90 L.Q.R. 531 (1974). See also Pace, supra note 64, at
141-49.
66. In England the duty was conceded in McKay v. Essex Area Health Auth., [1982] 1
Q.B. 1166, and was admitted in Williams v. Luff, The Times (London), Feb. 14, 1978, at 13,
col. 2. It was recognized in Australia in Watt v. Rama, [1972] 1 Q.B. 353, and in Canada in
Duval v. Seguin, 26 D.L.R. 3d 418 (1972).
67. Sec. 1(1). The section only allows an action if there is a breach of duty to the child's
parent. This may cause problems if the doctor has conflicting obligations to the child and
mother. See Eskelaar & Dingwall, Some Legal Issues in Obstetric Practice, 1984 J.S.W.L. 258,
264-70.
68. See sec. l(2Xa); but see sec. l(2)(b), allowing an action for pre-conception events lead-
ing to deformity. Is this not a "wrongful life" claim? See Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for
"Wrongful Life, I ISRAEL L.R. 513, 531 (1966).
69. [1982] 1 Q.B. 1166.
70. The Supreme Court of California in Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. App. 3d 220, 643 P.2d
954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1982); and Washington in Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, 98 Wash. 460,
656 P.2d 483 (1983) have recognized the action. See generally Capron, Tort Liability in Ge-
netic Counseling 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618 (1979).
71. [1984] 2 All E.R. 513.
72. [1984] 3 All E.R. 1044.
73. The cases arose from failed sterilizations. See Grubb, Failure of Sterilization-Dam-
ages for "Wrongful Conception" C.L.J. Mar. 1985. But see Sciuriaga v. Powell, 123 So. J. 406
(1979), discussed by Robertson, Damages for Failed Abortion, 44 M.L.R. 215 (1981).
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Service (General Medical and Pharmaceutical Services) Regulations 1974."
Similarly a general practitioner is contractually required to treat a tempo-
rary resident7" and emergency cases.76 But what of a stranger, not within
these categories, who merely presents himself at the doctor's consulting
room; is the doctor obliged to be the "good samaritan"? It is arguable that
he has no obligation to treat such people, because they have not yet become
his patients.
The hospital doctor is somewhat different because the 1974 Regulations
do not apply to him. Does a hospital doctor have to treat anyone in a hospi-
tal? Certainly anyone who is admitted to the hospital is owed a duty of
care,7 7 but what of the person who presents himself at the casualty or out-
patients department seeking medical assistance? It is likely that the court
would decide that a duty to treat was owed by a doctor in this situation if he
was available to treat the arrival, because the hospital would have held itself
out as willing to treat anyone presenting himself.7 To withdraw unilaterally
this service, certainly for no good reason,' 9 would be unfairA0 8s
(ii) Causation
In medical negligence cases, as indeed with any negligence case, the plain-
tiff must establish that the defendant's action caused the injury for which
compensation is now sought.8 2 The injured patient has to show that "but
for" the doctor's negligence the injury would not have resulted. 3 Some-
times establishing this factual causation may be extremely difficult.
74. Stat. Inst. No. 160 (1974) (as amended). Reg. 3 and Sch. 1, para. 4(l)(a) and (b). The
duty is "to render. . . all necessary and appropriate personal medical services of the type
usually provided by general medical practitioners." (Sch. 1 para. 13).
75. I at Sch. 1, para. 4(lX).
76. Id at Sch. 1, para. 4(l)(h).
77. Gold v. Essex County Council, [1942] 2 K.B. 293.
78. Barnett v. Chelsea and Kensington Hosp. Management Comm., [1969] 1 Q.B. 428;
Cassidy v. Ministry of Health, [1951] 2 K.B. 341. See Lee, Hospital Admissions-Duty of
Care, 129 NEW L.J. 567 (1979).
79. Would, for instance, a strike within the N.H.S. remove the "duty to treat"? Could a
strike lead to an action by a casualty victim who goes untreated? See Dworkin, Strikes and the
National Health Service: Some Legal and Ethical Issues, 3 J. MED. ETH. 76 (1977),
80. In the Barnett case, [1969] 1 Q.B. at 436, Judge Nield thought that a hospital casualty
officer was not under a duty to see everyone who presented themselves, for example, a visitor
who was merely seeking a second opinion or who had only a minor cut which could be dressed
by a nurse.
81. See Williams, Causation in the Law, 19 C.L.J. 62 (1961).
82. See R. DIAS & B. MARKESINIS, TORT LAW 68-78 (1984); A. LINDEN, CANADIAN
TORT LAW 89-99 (3rd ed. 1982); J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS Ch. 9 (6th ed. 1983).
83. Cork v. Kirby Maclean, [1952] 2 All E.R. 402; McWilliams v. Sir William Arrol &
Co., [1962] 1 W.L.R. 295. There are exceptions: Cook v. Lewis, [1952] 1 D.L.R. 1; Baker v.
Willoughby 1970 A.C. 467. Contra Jobling v. Assoc. Dairies, 1982 A.C. 794.
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In Barnett v. Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee,84
the plaintiff presented himself early one morning at the casualty department
of a hospital complaining that he had been vomiting for three hours. The
nurse on duty telephoned and reported the plaintiff's complaints to the duty
casualty officer, who instructed the plaintiff to go home and call his own
doctor. Some five hours later the plaintiff died of arsenic poisoning. His
widow sued the hospital for its negligence in not treating or diagnoising her
husband's condition. Nield, J., held that the hospital owed the plaintiff's
husband a duty of care 5 and that the casualty officer had been in breach of
that duty in not seeing and examining the plaintiffis husband. Nevertheless,
he found for the defendant hospital because the plaintiff could not show on a
balance of probabilities that the negligence had caused the plaintiff's hus-
band's death. The judge accepted expert evidence that the plaintiff's hus-
band might have died from the poisoning even if he had been admitted into
the hospital because the results of diagnostic tests would not have been avail-
able in time.
The difficulty of positively establishing, even if only on a balance of
probability, that the injury would not have resulted "but for" the negligence
is often difficult enough in a malpractice claim brought by an adult patient
but in relation to pre-natal torts the difficulties can be overwhelming. When
the Law Commission reported in 1974 on Injuries to Unborn Children, 6
which led to the enactment of the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability)
Act 1976, it was thought that proof of causation would become easier in
these sorts of cases because medical knowledge was "rapidly expanding.
'87
However, when the Pearson Commission reported in 1978 they regarded
these statements as "over-optimistic" in the light of medical evidence sub-
mitted to them.8 As medical knowledge increases so do the doubts and
uncertainties of cause and effect.
These uncertainties of cause and effect may not trouble a plaintiff in a
medical malpractice case, however his injuries were caused, if a court were
prepared to use a notion developed in McGhee v. National Coal Board.89
The plaintiff contracted dermatitis while employed by the defendants to
clean out bright kilns. The defendants did not provide adequate washing
facilities, so the plaintiff was unable to wash before going home. The medi-
84. [1969] 1 Q.B. 428.
85. Id at 439.
86. Law commission Report No. 60 (1974), supra note 1.
87. Id. at para. 20. See generally on "medical knowledge", paras. 18-31.
88. Id. at para. 1447. See generally paras. 1441-52.
89. [1972] 3 All E.R. 1008. See Weinrib, A Step Forward in Factual Causation, 38 M.L.R.
518 (1975); and Robertson, Overcoming the Causation Hurdle in Informed Consent Cases: The
Principle in McGhee v. N.CB., 22 U.W. ONT. L. REV. 75 (1984).
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cal evidence indicated that dermatitis could be caused by dusty working con-
ditions and that the fact that the plaintiff cycled home from work, perspiring
and covered with dust making it adhere to his skin, materially increased the
risk of contracting the disease. However, the plaintiff was unable to prove
on a balance of probabilities that provision of adequate washing facilities
(which it was accepted it was negligent not to do) would have prevented him
from developing dermatitis. In other words, he could not show that but for
the negligent behaviour he would not have suffered injury. The House of
Lords held that the plaintiff was entitled to win in his negligence claim. It
was enough that the plaintiff had shown that the breach of duty by the de-
fendants had "materially contributed to his injury",' or had "substantially
contribute[d] towards injury."9
The McGhee case may be understood in one of two ways.92 First, the
House of Lords may have intended to reject the "but for" test altogether and
replace it by one of "material contribution"; establishing this would mean
that a plaintiff had proved causation. It is unlikely that the House of Lords
intended such a drastic change in the law as it had been understood for some
time.93 It would probably be better to restrict their new way of proving
causation to the type of case they were considering, namely, one in whch it is
very difficult, if not impossible, to obtain expert evidence to satisfy the "but
for" test.9' As Lord Wilberforce said, remarking on the inherent evidential
difficulty9" the plaintiff was facing:
[I[f one asks which of the parties, the workman or the employers
should suffer from this inherent evidential difficulty, the answer as
a matter of policy or justice should be that it is the creator of the
risk who, ex hypothesis, must be taken to have foreseen the possi-
bility of damage, who should bear its consequences.96
Support for this interpretation of McGhee can be found in the judgment of
Mustill, J., in the recent case Thompson v. Smiths Shiprepairers (North
Shields) Ltd.,9 7 in which the plaintiffs claimed damages in negligence for
90. [1972] 3 All E.R. at 1010-11 (Lord Reid). See also Lord Wilberforce at 1012-13, Lord
Kilbrandon at 1015-16 and Lord Salmon at 1017-18.
91. Id at 1014 (Lord Simon).
92. See Robertson, supra note 89, at 81-86.
93. The House of Lords case of McWilliams v. Sir William Arrol & Co., [1962] 1 W.L.R.
295, is against giving McGhee general currency.
94. This would explain Barnett, [1969] 1 Q.B. 428, and why the Court of Appeal in
Robinson v. Post Office, (1974] 1 W.L.R. 1176, thought McGhee, [1972] 3 All E.R. 1008,
unimportant on the facts of the case.
95. McGhee, [1972] 3 All E.R. at 1014-15 (Lord Simon), 1018 (Lord Salmon) and 1016
(Lord Kilbrandon).
96. Id. at 1012.
97. (1984] 1 All E.R. 881, 909.
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deafness caused at work. Mustill, J., after remarking that the sole issue in
McGhee was whether the plaintiff had established causation, went on:
Where McGhee did break new ground was in the solution to the
plaintiffs'. . . problem [of establishing "but for" causation]. The
"evidential gap" created by the absence of proof that the breach
was at the very least a causa sine qua non was bridged by treating
the proof that the breach had increased the risk of disease as if it
were proof that the breach had actually caused the disease. This
device was a fiction. . . but it was one which had to be adopted in
the interests of justice, to prevent the plaintiff from losing his claim
through failure to prove what, in the current state of medical
knowledge, he had no means of proving.
The second way of explaining McGhee is to see it as presumptively shifting
the burden of proof to the defendant.9" Once it is established by the plaintiff
that the defendant's negligence had made the damage significantly more
likely to occur, it would then be for the defendant to prove, presumably on a
balance of probabilities, that the damage would have resulted even if there
had been no negligence. This was the interpretation of McGhee accepted by
Peter Pain, J., in Clark v. McLennan." It is likely that the shift in the bur-
den of proof should also only occur where there are significant evidential
difficulties for the plaintiff in establishing the "but for" test." 0
Providing the necessity for "evidential difficulty" is remembered, there
may be little, if any, difference in the outcome of a given case by regarding
McGhee as a bridge across an evidential gap or a shifting of the "burden of
proof."'O' Even if there is, either explanation of McGhee would considera-
bly help a medical malpractice plaintiff in establishing the "tricky" element
of causation. As yet there appears to be only one unreported English case
which has applied McGhee in a malpractice action.0 2 But in Canada, in
Powell v. Guttman (No. 2), 103 when holding a doctor liable for a fractured
bone which occurred during an operation, the Manitoba Court of Appeal
applied McGhee. O'Sullivan, J., said:
98. See Linden, supra note 82 at 96-99.
99. [1983] 1 All E.R. 416, 427 and Wilsher v. Essex, (unreported) Dec. 21, 1984. See also
Nowsco Well Service v. Canadian Propane Gas and Oil Ltd., 122 D.L.R. 3d 228 (1981).
100. In Nowsco Well Services, 122 D.L.R. 3d 228, 246 (1981) Bayda J.A. said "[I]fcausa-
tion is overwhelmingly difficult to prove ... then it is a matter of public policy or justice that
it is the creator of the risk who should be put to the trouble of hurdling the difficulty .
101. Wilsher v. Essex, (unreported) Dec. 21, 1984.
102. Id. The same judge in Clark v. MacLennan, [1983] 1 All E.R. 416, used McGhee,
[1972] 3 All E.R. 1008, to establish a shift in the burden of proving a breach of duty.
103. [1978] 5 W.W.R. 228. But see Moore v. Shaughnessy Hosp. (unreported) cited in
Wilson v. Vancouver Hockey Club, 5 D.L.R. 4d 282, 291 (1984) (Esson J. rejected McGhee,
[1972] 3 All E.R. 1008, in British Columbia).
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[W]here a tortfeasor creates or materially contributes to a signifi-
cant risk of injury occurring and injury does occur which is
squarely within the risk thus created or materially increased, then
unless the risk is spent, the tortfeasor is liable for injury which fol-
lows from the risk, even though there are other subsequent causes
which also cause or materially contribute to that injury."0 4
(iii) Standard of Care
Perhaps the most difficult problem facing a patient in a medical malprac-
tice case is caused by his need to prove a failure by the doctor to observe the
standard of care required by law. As with all negligence cases, the courts
apply the standard of "reasonable man",105 transformed in this context to
the "reasonable doctor" standard.
Establishing negligence against a doctor is difficult. Lack of evidence may
be an obstacle. Sometimes the res ipsa loquitur maxim may help a patient. 1 6
Translated, the maxim means, "the facts speak for themselves." The effect
of this maxim is not to remove the need to prove negligence, but to produce
an alteration in the evidential burden of proof to the doctor who, because on
the facts it looks as if the patient's injuries must have been caused by negli-
gence, has to show that some other non-negligent explanation of the events
in issue is possible. In Cassidy v. Ministry of Health,107 the plaintiff under-
went an operation on two stiff fingers. After the operation all four of the
plaintiff's fingers on that hand were stiff because they had been bandaged too
tightly. The Court of Appeal found for the plaintiff, Denning, L.J. (as he
then was), said:
If the plaintiff had to prove that some particular doctor or nurse
was negligent he would not be able to do it. But he was not put to
that impossible task; he said: I went into the hospital to be cured
of two stiff fingers. I have come out with four stiff fingers and my
hand is useless. That should not have happened if due care had
been used. Explain it if you can.108
In the end the maxim is of limited use in a limited number of cases.' 0 9
104. Powell v. Guttman, [1978] 5 W.W.R. 228.
105. The "ieasonable man" is often described as "the man on the Clapham omnibus", Hall
v. Brooklands Auto-Racing Club, [1933] 1 K.B. 205, 224.
106. The maxim appears to have originated in the judgment of Chief Baron Pollock in
Byrne v. Boadle, [1863] 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299. For an excellent discussion, see
Lewis, A Ramble With Res Ipsa Loquitor 11 C.L.S. 75 (1931).
107. (1951] 2 K.B. 343. See also Mahon v. Osborne, [1939] 2 K.B. 14.
108. Cassidy v. Ministry of Health, [1951] 2 K.B. at 365.
109. See the cases collected in Linden, supra note 82, at 259-60 and MacDonald v. York
County Hosp. Corp., [1972] 3 D.R. 469, 486-92 (Addy J.).
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The judges are reluctant to use the maxim in medical cases for fear that it
would impose too heavy a burden upon the profession." " The utility of the
maxim is really only evident in obvious cases; medical cases rarely are. "'
As one judge put it, "medical science has not yet reached the stage where the
law ought to presume that a patient must come out of an operation as well or
better than he went into it."' 1 2
In the vast majority of cases the patient is thrown back to proving the
doctor's negligence by other means. These other means will invariably re-
quire the introduction of expert evidence by the plaintiff that the doctor's
conduct was unreasonable. As the recent case of Maynard v. West Midland
Regional Health Authority"13 illustrates, the patient faces a very difficult
task. In Maynard the plaintiff was diagnosed as probably suffering from tu-
berculosis but the consultant surgeon and physician who were treating her
thought there might be a possibility of Hodgkin's disease. Because this dis-
ease is fatal unless treated at an early stage they decided to carry out an
operation called a mediastinoscopy, an operation which had an inherent risk
of damage to a vocal cord nerve, as a diagnostic test to provide a biopsy.
Fortunately, the plaintiff did not have Hodgkin's disease, only tuberculosis;
but unfortunately, damage to the vocal cord nerve occurred and the plaintiff
suffered paralysis of the left vocal cord.
The plaintiff sued the Regional Health Authority as vicariously liable for
their employees' negligence. The plaintiff did not allege that the operation
itself was carried out incompetently but argued instead that it should not
have been carried out at all. She argued that it was negligent to do so be-
cause the doctors should have realized that tuberculosis was the only proper
diagnosis and that therefore the operation was unnecessary. The House of
Lords held that the standard of care which a doctor has to observe when
diagnosing and treating his patient had been authoritatively established by
the House of Lords in Whitehouse v. Jordan. "i' In that case the plaintiff, a
child, claimed that a doctor in delivering him had negligently performed a
forceps birth by pulling too long and too hard so that his head had become
impacted producing asphyxia which caused severe brain damage. In holding
that the doctor had not been negligent, Lord Edmund-Davies said:
110. Holmes v. London Hosp. 81 D.L.R. 3d 67 (1978) (Robins J.). In Chapman v. Rix,
The Times (London), Dec. 22, 1960, at 3, col. 1. Lord Denning said, "It is not right to invoke
.. .the maxim res ipsa loquitor save in an extreme case."
111. Wilcox v. Cavan, 50 D.L.R. 3d 687 (1975) (Richie J.).
112. Girard v. Royal Columbian Hosp., 66 D.L.R. 3d 676, 691 (1976) (Andrews J.).
113. [1984] 1 W.L.R. 634.
114. [1981] 1 W.L.R. 246. See Robertson, Whitehouse v. Jordan-Medical Negligence Re-
tired, 44 M.L.R. 457 (1981).
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The test is the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising
and professing to have that special skill. If a surgeon fails to mea-
sure up to that standard in any respect ("clinical judgment" or
otherwise), he has been negligent. .... 11l
Even though the doctor may be exceptionally eminent or exceptionally
skillful, he is only legally required, though not perhaps ethically, to come up
to the standards of the ordinary skilled man in his field.116 Even a novice or
intern must come up to the ordinary standards of his more experienced
peers.
117
The English courts have held that the reasonable doctor is not someone
who promises to cure his patient, although exceptionally they may conclude
this."'8 The reasonable doctor is not a medical prophet and so he is to be
judged upon the knowledge of his subject at the time of the allegedly negli-
gent act, even if medical knowledge has changed by the time of the trial,11 9
but he is not a medical scholar who has read all the recent medical literature,
although "[t]he time may come in a particular case when a new recommen-
dation may well be so well proved and so well known, and so well accepted
that it should be adopted ... 12o
The question now arises: how does the plaintiff show that this doctor's
treatment fell below the legal standard? In non-professional negligence cases
the evaluative question of "what would the reasonable man do?" Can usu-
ally be decided by the judge alone without the aid of evidence as to the
reasonable man's conduct. The test is one of common knowledge mixed with
the application of common sense; therefore, no expert evidence is normally
necessary. However, in professional negligence cases it is quite different.
What doctors do, or do not do, in particular situations is not common
knowledge, nor is the evaluation inherent in the standard usually one suscep-
tible of resolution by common sense. The judge is no longer able to decide
alone and unaided. He requires expert professional evidence to guide him as
to professional practice. It is at this stage that the doctor is most protected
by the courts. Compliance with common practice is always good evidence
115. [1981] 1 W.L.R. at 258.
116. George Wimpy & Co. v. Poole, (decision of Webster J., 18 April 1984), unreported
except in 1 PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 37 (1985). But see the tentative view of Kilner
Brown J. in Ashcroft v. Mersey Regional Health Auth., [1983] 2 All E.R. 245.
117. McKeachie v. Alvarez, 17 D.L.R. 3d 87 (1971); Nettleship v. Weston, [1971] 2 Q.B.
691 (inexperienced driver expected to exercise skill and care of the ordinary competent driver).
118. See Thake v. Maurice, [1984] 2 All E.R. 513.
119. Roe v. Minister of Health, [1954] 2 Q.B. 66.
120. Crawford v. Charing Cross Hosp., The Times (London), Dec. 8, 1953, at 5, col, 5
(Denning, L.J.).
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that the defendant's behaviour was proper in any negligence case.' 2' As
Maugham, L.J., said in Marshall v. Lindley C.C.: "An act cannot, in my
opinion, be held to be due to want of reasonable care if it is in accordance
with the general practice of mankind."' 22 In the majority of cases the courts
have, on the whole, 123 treated general and approved practice, not as conclu-
sive of an absence of negligence, but merely as raising a prima facie presump-
tion of none.
124
In medical negligence cases "evidence of general practice is accorded
more respect . . . than it receives in other types of cases because there is
greater judicial trust in the reasonableness of a sister-profession than there is
in the methods of commercial men."' 25 As a consequence, in medical cases,
proof of compliance with professional practice almost always makes the doc-
tor's conduct reasonable and, therefore, not negligent.
Lord Scarman made this most apparent when in Maynard he said:
It is not enough to show that there is a competent professional
body of opinion which considers that [the doctor's] decision was
wrong, if there also exists a body of professional opinion, equally
competent, which supports the decision as reasonable in the cir-
cumstances. It is not enough to show that subsequent events show
that the operation need never have been performed, if at the time
the decision to operate was taken it was reasonable in the sense
that a responsible body of medical opinion would have accepted it
as proper. 1
26
Now, of course, a plaintiff has a double hurdle to climb. Not only does he
have to find "competent professional opinion" to support his view that the
treatment or, as in Maynard, the diagnosis was wrong, not being in accord-
ance with accepted professional practice, but he has to hope that the defend-
ant can not find anyone who will give evidence to the opposite effect. If this
evidence exists and is called at the trial the court will not find the doctor
negligent. The court will not choose between two competent, but opposing,
professional opinions. As Lord President Clyde put it in the Scottish case of
Hunter v. Hanley:
121. In Edwards Wong Finance Co. Ltd. v. Johnson, Stokes & Master, [1984] 2 W.L.R. 1,
solicitors were held negligent even though they had complied with professional conveyancing
practice.
122. [1935] 1 K.B. 516, 540.
123. Compare Marshall v. Lindsey, (1935] 1 K.B. 516 with Vancouver General Hosp. v.
McDaniel, 152 L.T.R. 56, 57 (1934).
124. White v. Turner, 120 D.L.R. 3d 269, 279 (1981) where Linden, J. explains: "[I]f [the
defendant's] work complies with the custom of his confererees, he will normally escape civil
liability .... " (emphasis added). See Linden, supra note 82, at 161-77.
125. Linden, supra note 82, at 164.
126. Maynard, (1984] 1 W.L.R. at 638.
Medical Malpractice in England
In the realm of diagnosis and treatment there is ample scope for
genuine difference of opinion. .. . [T]he true test for establishing
negligence. . . is whether [the doctor] has been proved to be guilty
of such a failure as no doctor of ordinary skill would be guilty of if
acting with ordinary care. . .,i2 (emphasis added)
This is a considerable impediment to the success of most plaintiffs in medical
negligence cases unless the doctor's action is absurdly wrong or incompe-
tent. There must, of course, exist a competent body of professional opinion.
A "crank" view of medical practice would not be covered and would cer-
tainly be categorized by the courts as a negligent one.
Some judges initially went further in isolating the medical professional
from findings of negligence but this more protective approach, which is out
of line with other areas of professional negligence, is no longer supported.
For instance, Lord Denning's assertion, when Whitehouse v. Jordan'2 was
before the Court of Appeal, that an "error of judgment" by a doctor could
never amount to negligence was rejected by the House of Lords on appeal in
that case' 29 because, as Lord Fraser said: "Merely to describe something as
an error of judgment tells us nothing about whether it is negligent or not.
The true position is that an error of judgment may, or may not, be negligent;
it depends on the nature of the error."1 30 Therefore, it all depends upon
whether the "error of judgment" was one which a "reasonable doctor" could
make. It follows from this that such an error is very unlikely to be negligent
unless the doctor's clinical judgment was based upon a perverse medical
view.
When the "reasonable doctor" test was applied to the facts of Maynard,
although the plaintiff found medical witnesses who thought the diagnosis
had been wrong, unfortunately for her the defendant had found witnesses
who thought it had been correct and so the House of Lords concluded that




'Why do you assume you have the right to decide for someone
127. 1955 S.L.T. 213, 217. (Quoted with approval by Lord Scarman in Maynard, [1984] 1
W.L.R. at 638).
128. (1980] 1 All E.R. at 650, 658. He also expressed the view in Tucks v. Cole, The Times
(London), May 9, 1968, Hatcher v. Black, Roe v. Minister of Health, [1954] 2 Q.B. at 87.
129. [1981] 1 All E.R. 267.
130. I at 284-85. See also, Lord Edmund-Davies at 276-80 and Lord Russell at 284-85.
131. Robertson, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment, 97 L.Q.R. 102 (1981). See
generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: A
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else? Don't you agree it's a terrifying right, one that rarely leads to
good? You should be careful. No one's entitled to it, not even
doctors.' 'But doctors are entitled to the right-doctors above all,'
exclaimed Dontsova with deep conviction. By now she was really
angry. 'Without that right there'd be no such thing as
medicine!" 32
In one area of medical malpractice the courts have been asked to depart
from the "reasonable doctor" standard. Both Whitehouse v. Jordan'3 3 and
Maynard v. West Midland Regional Health Authority' 34 were cases of negli-
gent treatment or diagnosis. In several recent English cases it has been ar-
gued that when a doctor is advising a patient about possible medical
treatment he is under a duty to disclose the risks inherent in the treatment
he proposes and the alternative treatments to the one suggested. It has been
argued that the doctor has to disclose, not the risks which a reasonable doc-
tor would disclose, but instead those risks which a reasonable or prudent
patient would wish to know in making a rational choice whether to undergo
the treatment or not. It is argued that, unlike treatment and diagnosis, the
.matters of which risks should be disclosed to a patient are not a question for
professional judgment and so the "reasonable doctor" standard is
inappropriate.
This approach would pay more respect to the patient's right to determine
what should be done with his body and so would conform more to the ethi-
cally accepted principle of "self-determination" or "autonomy" which is the
basis for the legal requirement of consent prior to touching. 135 In this area
more than any other the courts are being asked to resolve the "conflict be-
tween its vision of human beings as autonomous persons and its deference to
paternalism, another powerful vision of man's interaction with man.' 36
(a) United States
In America these arguments have been accepted in many states. 137 The
REPORT ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE
PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP (1982) [hereinafter cited as MAKING HEALTH CARE
DECISIONS].
132. Dworkin, Autonomy and Informed Consent, 3 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS,
supra note 131, at 631 (quoting Solzhenitsyn).
133. Whitehouse, [1981] 1 W.L.R. 246.
134. Maynard, (1984] 1 W.L.R. 634.
135. See Dworkin, supra note 132; T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BI-
OMEDICAL ETHICS chs. 3, 7 (2d ed. 1983); C. FAULDER, WHO'S BODY Is IT?. (1985).
136. Katz, Informed Consent - A Fairy Tale?: Law's Vision, 39 U. PITr. L. REV. 137, 139
(1977).
137. 3 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 131, at 206-45 (Appendix L con-
tains a chart outlining the standard of disclosure adopted in each United States jurisdiction).
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courts in these states have developed a "doctrine of informed consent" 3 '
which requires that the risks a "prudent patient" would want to know must
be disclosed;139 if they are not, then the patient has an action in negli-
gence.1" In addition, the patient must show that the failure to disclose
caused his injury in the sense that both he 4 ' and a reasonable patient 42
knowing of those risks would not have undergone the treatment. Initially
some states have allowed a patient in these circumstances to treat the non-
disclosure as vitiating the patient's consent to the medical procedure and so
have allowed him to bring an action in battery. Although some states still
permit this,143 most today have rejected the possibility of a battery action
unless "the treatment consists of a touching that is of a substantially differ-
ent nature and character from that to which the patient consented." ' " Con-
sequently, in the case of failure by a doctor to inform the patient of the risks
involved in a treatment, the patient is left with only the option of suing in
negligence.
The American cases have based the "doctrine of informed consent"
predominantly upon three theories. In many cases, these theories are inter-
twined and not always treated separately. As is shown above, at first the
courts took the view that failure to inform a patient of risks in a medical
procedure vitiated the patient's consent and so initially a battery action lay.
In Canterbury v. Spence 45 the court "borrowed" this idea of lack of consent
and transferred it wholesale into the tort of negligence. A non-consensual
touching, because all the risks a "prudent patient" would wish to know had
not been disclosed, became a breach of duty in negligence."' In the more
138. For the case which is often said to have begun the development, see Nathanson v.
Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1976) (clarified by Nathanson v. Kline, 187 Kan. 186,
354 P.2d 670 (1960)); see also Williams v. Menehan, 191 Kan. 6, 379 P.2d 292 (1963) (Wil-
liams actually recognized an action in negligence for non-disclosure of risks utilizing the "rea-
sonable doctor" test).
139. One jurisdiction may have gone further and required disclosure of the risks which this
patient would have wanted to know. See Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 558 (Okla. 1979).
See also McPherson v. Ellis, 305 N.C. 266, 287 S.E.2d 892 (1982) (reversed by statute).
140. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, (1972); Wilkinson v. Vessey, 110 R.I. 606,
295 A.2d 676 (1972); Miller v. Kennedy, 85 Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975) affig 11 Wash.
App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974), aff'd on rehearing, 91 Wash. 2d 155, 588 P.2d 734 (1978). But
see Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645, 222 S.E.2d 783 (1976).
141. See Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902 (1980).
142. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 772.
143. See, eg., Congrove v. Holmes, 37 Ohio Misc. 95, 308 N.E.2d 765 (1973).
144. Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 699 (Minn. 1977). See also supra notes 38-61
and accompanying text.
145. 464 F.2d at 772.
146. See Sidaway, [1985] 2 W.L.R. at 499 (Lord Diplock provides an explanation of
Canterbury).
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recent Maryland Court of Appeals decision in Sard v. Hardy4 7 the court
observed:
The doctrine of informed consent. . . follows logically from the
universally recognized rule that a physician, treating a mentally
competent adult under non-emergency circumstances, cannot
properly undertake to perform surgery or administer other therapy
without the prior consent of his patient. In order for the patient's
consent to be effective, it must have been an "informed" consent
148
However, in most of the cases, and particularly the recent ones, the courts
have begun to shy away from this, at times imperceptible, slide from non-
consensual battery to breach of duty to disclose in negligence. Instead the
courts have relied on two other bases for the "informed consent" doctrine.
The combined factors inherent in the doctor-patient relationship of pa-
tient trust stemming from the inequality of scientific knowledge between the
parties to the relationship,' 49 along with the self-evident fact that the pa-
tient's body is being interfered with, have led courts to find that a fiduciary
relationship exists between doctor and patient. Arising from this is a fiduci-
ary duty and it is upon this peg that some courts have chosen to hang the
duty to disclose in negligence.' 50
Lastly, the courts have utilized a modified version of the battery action
theory outlined above. The courts have looked to a "patient's right to
choose" what should be done with his or her body. This is merely a legal
manifestation of the ethical principles of "autonomy" and "self-determina-
tion", something which it shares in common with the law's view that all
touching must be consensual. This modified theory, unlike the theory devel-
oped in Canterbury, does not depend upon a finding that the patient's con-
sent was vitiated. The courts' reasoning that a patient's "right to choose"
what should be done with his body can only be meaningfully exercised if he
knows the risks inherent in the medical procedure and the alternatives to it.
One judge described the patient's right to exercise control over his own body
as "[t]he fountainhead of the doctrine of informed consent."'"' It is a small
step from this to require that all risks which "a prudent patient" would wish
to know should be disclosed. 5 ' The court in Canterbury appears to have
relied upon this theory. Judge Robinson in Canterbury stated that "[t]he
147. 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977).
148. Id. at 438, 379 A.2d at 1019.
149. See Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 9; Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780.
150. Miller, 530 P.2d 334. See also Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 782.
151. Hardy, 379 A.2d at 1019. See also Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 11.
152. "Full" disclosure has almost uniformally been rejected because it is unrealistic and
has a prohibitive effect upon a doctor's practice. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786; (rejecting
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root premise is the concept, fundamental in American jurisprudence, that
'[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body'. . .. 1 3
Once it is accepted that the "doctrine of informed consent" is no longer
based solely upon the theory that the patient's consent is vitiated, making
the doctor's touching a battery, it follows that a patient who refuses treat-
ment, as a result of not being told of the risks of disease or injury if he does
not, can also bring an action for damages in negligence. In this situation
there is no touching and therefore no possibility of a battery action. In Tru-
man v. Thomas"5 the California Supreme Court allowed a patient in these
circumstances to sue in negligence. Mrs. Truman was advised by her doctor
to undergo a pap smear test, a diagnostic test for cervical cancer. The doctor
did not inform her of the risks of not undergoing the test, namely the unde-
tected development of cancer. Mrs. Truman refused the test and several
years later she died from cervical cancer. Her estate brought an action in
negligence based upon an absence of "informed consent." The supreme
court held that the action could be sustained even though she had not under-
gone any procedure but had, in fact, refused it. Chief Justice Bird said:
The duty to disclose was imposed . . . so that patients might
meaningfully exercise their right to make decisions about their own
bodies .... The importance of this right should not be dimin-
ished by the manner in which it is exercised. Further, the need for
disclosure is not lessened because the patients reject a recom-
mended procedure.' 5
(b) Canada
The Supreme Court of Canada in two cases in 1980, Hopp v. Lepp 56 and
Reibl v. Hughes, ' accepted the view that an action in negligence can be
brought against a doctor based upon his failure to tell his patient what a
"prudent patient", in the particular patient's circumstances, would want to
know. The Court in Reibl restricted the patient's action to one in negligence
and not battery. 58 The effects of these decisions in Canada were summa-
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 571, 317 P.2d
170, 181 (1957)); Hardy, 379 A.2d at 1022.
153. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780 (quoting Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp. 211
N.Y. 125, 126, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)).
154. 611 P.2d 902.
155. Id at 906.
156. 112 D.L.R.3d 67 (1980).
157. 114 D.L.R.3d 1 (1980). For a commentary on the case and Canadian developments,
see Picard, Patients Doctors and the Supreme Court of Canada I O.J.L.S. 441 (1981).
158. Reibi, 114 D.L.R.3d at 10-11.
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rized by Linden, J., in White v. Turner,'59 one of the first cases decided in the
wake of the Supreme Court decisions:
This does not mean that Canadian doctors must now give com-
plicated seminars on medicine to all their patients. It does mean,
though, that more time may have to be spent explaining things to
their patients than in the past. The law as espoused by the
Supreme Court of Canada requires that patients should be treated
as intelligent, mature and rational individuals. The ultimate effect
of this new approach should be medical practitioners who are even
more sensitive, concerned and humane than they now are. More-
over, the doctor-patient relationship should be improved greatly by
the better communication between doctors and their patients. The
high level of trust Canadians now have in their doctors should be
even higher. Another beneficial consequence may be even fewer
malpractice actions than are now instituted in this country. If
these results flow from Reibl v. Hughes, it will have rendered our
community a most valuable service." °
The Canadian judge and torts scholar clearly has high hopes for the doc-
trine of "informed consent" in Canada. It remains to be seen whether they
are fulfilled."6
(c) England
Will the English courts embrace the transatlantic "doctrine of informed
consent", with all the advantages and benefits for the doctor-patient relation-
ship it is claimed to have? In two first-instance cases, Chatterton v. Ger-
son162 and Hills v. Potter, 163 judges decided that the "doctrine of informed
consent" formed no part of English law." In both cases the courts ac-
cepted the formulation of the standard of disclosure of risks and alternatives
given by McNair, J., in Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee
165
which, although predominantly a treatment and diagnosis case, did raise the
issue of the standard of disclosure of risks in a treatment. Until recently no
appellate court had considered the matter; but earlier this year the House of
159. 120 D.L.R.3d 269 (1981), appeal dismissed, 12 D.L.R.4d 319 (1985).
160. 120 D.L.R. 3d at 290.
161. See also Robertson, Informed Consent in Canada: An Empirical Study, 22 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 139 (1984) (Robertson questions whether the medical profession has either been
aware of the issues in Reibl or has, consequently, been affected by the decision).
162. Chatterton, [1981] 1 Q.B. 432.
163. Hills [1984] 1 W.L.R. 641.
164. See also Wells v. Surrey Area Health Auth., (July 28, 1978, unreported). Sankey v.
Kensington Chelsea and Westminster Area Health Auth. (Apr. 2, 1982, unreported), Q.B.D.;
Freeman, [1984] 1 Q.B. 524.
165. [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582, 586-588.
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Lords upheld this view in Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem
Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital1"
(i) The Facts
Mrs. Sidaway suffered from pain and discomfort in her arm and shoulder.
It was discovered that the cause was a significant narrowing of the spinal
column due to congenital fusion of some cervical vertebrae. In 1960, she
underwent an operation to relieve the pain which, at least for a while, it
succeeded in doing. However, the pain gradually returned, becoming pro-
gressively worse. In 1974 her surgeon, Mr. Falconer, performed a
lamnectomy upon her spine to relieve the pressure on a nerve root. Expert
evidence at the trial showed that inherent in this operation was a risk of
damaging the nerve root with consequent increase in pain but with no result-
ing paralysis. Also inherent in the operation was a lower risk of damage to
the spinal cord which could result in partial paralysis. This latter risk was
thought by the experts at the trial to have less than a one per cent chance of
occurring. Unfortunately for Mrs. Sidaway the spinal cord was damaged
and she suffered the partial paralysis. She sued the surgeon in negligence,
claiming that he had not told her of the risk of spinal cord damage but that,
in law, he should have done so. She claimed that if she had known of this
risk she would not have undergone the operation.
(ii) The Trial Judge
The trial judge held on the evidence that the risk had not been disclosed.
However, the judge held that the legal standard of disclosure was that of a
"reasonable doctor" relying on the earlier cases of Bolam v. Friern Hospital
Management Committee;167 Chatterton v. Gerson;"168 and Hills v. Potter.1 69
The judge rejected the American approach in Canterbury v. Spence170 and
the Canadian courts' adoption of it in Reibl v. Hughes. 71 Applying that
test, the judge found on the evidence, in accordance with expert evidence
given at the trial, that a "reasonable doctor" might not have disclosed the
risk. He went on to dismiss the plaintiff's claim even though he found as a
fact that Mrs. Sidaway would not have undergone the operation had she
166. No. 77-5-8348 (Q.B.D. Feb. 19, 192) (available on LEXIS, Engen Library, Cases
File).
167. Bolam, [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582.
168. Chatterton, [1981] 1 Q.B. 432.
169. Hillh [1984] 1 W.L.R. 641.
170. Canterbury, 464 F.2d 772.
171. ReWb 114 D.L.R.3d 1.
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known of the risk which eventually materialized.
7 2
(iii) The Court of Appeal
On appeal, the Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the trial judge's view
of the law.' 7 a All three judges" 4 rejected the notion that non-disclosure
could lead to a battery action. They further rejected the North American
approach that the standard of disclosure in a negligence action was to be
judged by the "prudent patient" test. Each of the judges was greatly influ-
enced by considerations of policy.
1' 5
First, Browne-Wilkinson, L.J., stated that to take the decision of which
risks should be disclosed away from the medical profession's own judgment
would lead to an undermining of the trust and confidence that is essential to
the doctor-patient relationship and would inhibit the doctor's primary duty
to cure the patient."76  Secondly, both Browne-Wilkinson and Dunn,
L.JJ., 7 saw the disclosure of risks which a patient would not necessarily
want to know. In short, knowledge might have to be forced upon a patient
against his will, even if that would be detrimental to the patient's health.
Thirdly, the judges foresaw the development of "defensive medicine" if the
court were to take the standard of disclosure away from the profession."
T8
As Professor Kennedy has put it,179 the judges were concerned in case "the
American disease might break out." Their reasoning is highly unsatisfactory
and the judges' conclusions on policy, if scrutinized (even superficially), are
remarkably lacking in foundation.'S°
The Court of Appeal's attitude was best summed up by Dunn, L.J., when
he said:
I confess that I reach this conclusion with no regret. The evi-
172. In all the previous English cases the courts had not believed the plaintiffs and had held
that the plaintiffs would have undergone the operation even had they known of the risk.
Sidaway was, therefore, the first case in which a plaintiff managed to establish causation.
173. For comments on the Court of Appeal decision, see Kennedy, The Patient on the
Clapham Omnibus, 47 M.L.R. 454 (1984) [hereinafter cited as "Kennedy"]; Grubb, Medical
Law - Doctors'Advice and the Reasonable Man: Do We Need a Second Opinion?, 43 C.L.J. 240
(1984) [hereinafter cited as "Grubb"].
174. Sir John Donaldson M.R., Dunn and Browne-Wilkinson, L.JJ.
175. The relevence of policy as a factor when developing the tort of negligence is highly
contentious and may be wholly illegitimate. See McLoughlin v. O'Brien, 1981 A.C. 410, 430.
Contra McKay v. Essex A.H.A., [1982] 1 Q.B. 1166.
176. Sidaway, [1984] 1 Q.B. at 521.
177. Id at 521, 516-17 (respectively).
178. Id at 517 (per Dunn L.J.), and 523 (Browne-Wilkinson L.J.).
179. See Kennedy, supra note 173, at 465.
180. Especially devastating is the criticism by Kennedy. Id. at 463-71. See also Grubb,
supra note 73, at 242-43.
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dence in this case showed that a contrary result would be damag-
ing to the relationship of trust and confidence between doctor and
patient, and might well have an adverse effect on the practice of
medicine. It is doubtful whether it would be of any significant ben-
efit to patients, most of whom prefer to put themselves unreserv-
edly in the hands of their doctors. This is not in my view
'paternalism,' . . . . It is simply an acceptance of the doctor/pa-
tient relationship as it has developed in this country. The principal
effect of [adopting the 'prudent patient' test] would likely be an
increase in the number of claims for professional negligence against
doctors. This would be likely to have an adverse effect on the gen-
eral standard of medical care, since doctors would inevitably be
concerned to safeguard themselves against such claims, rather than
to concentrate on their primary duty of treating their patients."'
These remarks run completely counter to the tenor and approach of the
President's Commission in its report, Making Health Care Decisions. It can
only be regretted that Dunn, L.J., and the other members of the Court of
Appeal, had not had this drawn to their attention. It should have made a
difference.
(iv) The House of Lords
In the House of Lords all the Law Lords"82 agreed that the plaintiff had
not shown that the defendant was in breach of his duty to her in failing to
disclose the risk of damage to her spinal cord when carrying out the opera-
tion. However, the views of the Law Lords are somewhat diverse and differ
fundamentally as to the appropriate standard of disclosure of risks inherent
in medical treatment.
(v) Lord Bridge
Lord Bridge'8 3 considered that the proper test of disclosure for risks in a
negligence action was the one adopted in treatment and diagnosis cases,
namely, whether the non-disclosure was in accordance with competent pro-
fessional practice. Lord Bridge approved the earlier English authorities, in
particular the Bolam decision,"' and rejected that approach in Canterbury
describing it "as quite impractical in application. ' 18 5 Lord Bridge gave
three reasons for this statement.
First, the Canterbury test gave "insufficient weight to the realities of the
181. Sidaway, [1984] 1 Q.B. at 517.
182. The Law Lords are Lords Scarman, Diplock, Keith, Bridge and Templeman.
183. Lord Keith, and in effect Lord Templeman, agreed with Lord Bridge.
184. Sidaway, [1985] 2 W.L.R. at 504-05.
185. Id. at 503.
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doctor/patient relationship."' 8 6 The realities his Lordship discovered are,
with respect, manifestations of the attitude which he himself seemed un-
happy with, namely, the view that "doctor knows best."' 8 7 His Lordship
considered the approach in Canterbury to be inconsistent with a doctor exer-
cising clinical judgment of how best he should disclose risks to a patient and
might result in an exercise of medical education. But worst of all, for his
Lordship, disclosure might "lead to that risk assuming an undue significance
in the patient's calculations."'' 18  This is the clearest judicial manifestation of
"doctor knows best" and highlights the worst of medical "paternalism"
which eventually seems to seduce the English judiciary. It is quite inconsis-
tent with Lord Bridge's earlier assertion: "It is clearly right to recognise
[sic] that a conscious adult patient of sound mind is entitled to decide for
himself whether or not he will submit to a particular course of treatment
19 Recognition of patient autonomy and its partner, informed con-
sent, was eventually subordinated by Lord Bridge to the doctor's (presump-
tively better) view that the patient should undergo the treatment advised.
Lord Bridge's second reason for rejecting the Canterbury approach was
based upon a mistaken view of the effects of the "prudent patient" test. His
Lordship believed it wrong for the court to consider expert evidence as only
relevant to the risks inherent in a treatment or to explain the alternatives to
that treatment, but not to be relevant to the standard of disclosure. Whilst
Canterbury appears to state this,"9 in Reibl, Laskin, C.J., although approv-
ing Canterbury, thought that expert evidence of the profession's practice
would still be relevant in applying the "prudent patient" test, although it
would not be conclusive of the risks which the Canterbury patient would
want to know. Therefore, it seems that Lord Bridge's anxiety was
misplaced.
The third reason he gave for rejecting Canterbury was that the test was:
so imprecise as to be almost meaningless. If it is to be left to
individual judges to decide for themselves what 'a reasonable per-
son in the patient's position' would consider a risk of sufficient sig-
nificance that he should be told about it, the outcome of litigation
in this field is likely to be quite unpredictable. 9'
Perhaps the outcome would be less predictable than the safer sanctuary of
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 504.
189. Id. at 502.
190. See Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 10. See also Sidaway, supra note 43, at 494. See generally
Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 1084 (1973).
191. Sidaway, [1985] 2 W.L.R. at 504.
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the "reasonable doctor" test, but judges armed with medical evidence of the
risks involved, the seriousness of the consequences which might occur, and
the degree of likelihood of injury occurring, would soon be able to develop a
level of certainty. After all, why should this be so important if it is believed
that a patient's right to choose whether to undergo the treatment should be
protected by the law?
Perhaps more troublesome is the validity of premise for Lord Bridge's
view that the "reasonable doctor" standard would be more certain. The
premise is false since in relation to advice on risks, unlike treatment and
diagnosis cases, there is no "reasonable doctor" standard. Professor Ken-
nedy, commenting on the Court of Appeal decision in Sidaway, said:
In the context of the disclosure of information, the very notion
of a professional standard is something of a nonsense. There sim-
ply is no such standard, if only because the profession has not got
together to establish which risks should be disclosed, to which pa-
tients, in which circumstances.' 92
In the end the "reasonable doctor" standard is equally as "meaningless", in
Lord Bridge's sense, since the outcome of its application cannot be predicted
until expert evidence has been given at the trial.
Lord Bridge's respect for patient autonomy was really only skin deep. He
put an end to any possibility of real protection when he stated: "[W]hat
degree of disclosure of risks is best calculated to assist a particular patient to
make a rational choice whether or not to undergo a particular treatment
must primarily be a matter of clinical judgment."" (emphasis added).
With this attitude Lord Bridge could not possibly have adopted the pa-
tient-orientated Canterbury rule. However, surprisingly in view of this, Lord
Bridge did not wish to leave the medical profession the final say in what
should be disclosed, even if the "reasonable doctor" test was the legal stan-
dard of disclosure. Because the patient's right to choose or refuse treatment
was at stake, Lord Bridge thought the court could, in exceptional circum-
stances, overrule unanimous professional practice if the court thought it
right to do so where, for instance, a "substantial risk of grave adverse conse-
quences" was not disclosed. 94 In such circumstances the judge might con-
clude: "that disclosure of a particular risk was so obviously necessary to an
192. Kennedy, supra note 173, at 468. See also Hardy, 379 A.2d at 1021; Canterbury, 464
F.2d at 783.
193. Sidaway, [1985] 2 W.L.R. at 504.
194. Id at 505. See also Sidaway [1984] 1 Q.B. at 514 quoting Skinner, J. in Sidaway, No.
77-5-8348 ( Q.B.D. Feb 19, 1982) (available on LEXIS, Engen library, Cases File) (statement
of Sir John Donaldson M.R. in the Court of Appeal ): "The duty is fulfilled if the doctor in
accordance with a practice rightly as proper by a body of skilled and experienced medical
men."
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informed choice on the part of the patient that no reasonably prudent medi-
cal man would fail to make it."" Lord Bridge gave an example of such a
situation based upon the facts of Reibl. He said that even if it was profes-
sional practice not to disclose a ten per cent risk of a stroke arising from a
brain operation the court might, even in the face of the profession's unani-
mous view, hold that to be bad practice and a breach of a doctor's duty to
disclose.' 96 Such cases will undoubtedly be exceptional and will rarely
arise.'9 7 Usually, as indeed did Lord Bridge in Sidaway, the court will bow
to professional practice.
(vi) Lord Diplock
Lord Diplock accepted the "reasonable doctor" test without qualification.
For him the courts must always listen and follow professional practices as to
the sorts of risks involved in operations which must be disclosed. Lord
Diplock supported a paternalistic attitude, summed up in the phrase "doctor
knows best" when he said: "The only effect the mention of risks can have on
the patient's mind. . . can be in the direction of deterring the patient from
undergoing the treatment which in the expert opinion of the doctor it is in
the patient's interest to undergo."' 98 Compounding this fallacious and out-
moded perception of the needs of the modern doctor-patient relationship, his
Lordship concluded: "To decide what risks the existence of which a patient
should be voluntarily warned. . . is as much an exercise of professional skill
and judgment as any other part of the doctor's comprehensive duty of care
to the individual patient."' 99
Lord Diplock's view of the law only differs in emphasis from that of Lord
Bridge and their apparently disparate views as to the court's ability to judge
and override professional practice are unlikely to differ in their practical ap-
plication because of the rarity of case when the courts will brand profes-
sional practice perverse. In future cases Lord Bridge's opinion will be seen
as most representative of the Sidaway opinions. His "hostage to fortune", in
the shape of the courts' residuary power to override professional opinion, is a
certain recipe for litigation. When a doctor consults a lawyer as to his legal
duty to disclose risks to his patient " . . . [he] will be told [it] consists in
195. Id. at 505.
196. Lord Bridge also thought that in the case of a conflict of expert evidence as to whether
a competent body of professional opinion existed which supported nondisclosure, the court
would have to resolve it.
197. In F v. R., 33 S. Austl. St. R., 189, 196, 197 (King C.J.), 205-06 (Bollen J.) (1975), the
Supreme Court of South Australia looked critically at professional evidence when applying the
.reasonable doctor" standard.
198. Sidaway, [1985] 2 W.L.R. 500.
199. Id.
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setting a standard which is right. When they ask what rightness consists in,
they will be further advised that it involves setting a standard which con-
forms with their legal duty and which a judge does not subsequently think is
wrong!"2" This results in the very uncertainty and encouragement of litiga-
tion which his Lordship considered would flow from the Canterbury test and
was a prime motivation for his rejecting it.
(vii) Lord Scarman
Lord Scarman, however, was much bolder and he approved both Canter-
bury and Reibl and rejected the "reasonable doctor" test accepted in Bolam.
His Lordship rejected the notion of a fiduciary relationship as providing a
basis for the "doctrine of informed consent", as only being appropriate to
the relationships of "solicitor and client, trustee and cestui que trust or other
relationships treated in equity as of a fiduciary character." 20 ' The theory of
"informed consent" based upon a slide from battery to negligence, also
seemed to be rejected, because Lord Scarman stated that Mrs. Sidaway
would have no action in battery because she had consented to the
operation.202
Instead, in order to construct an English base for the doctrine, his Lord-
ship began by recognizing that the American and Canadian development of
a "doctrine of informed consent" stemmed from a patient's "right of 'self-
determination' ,;2o3 the right of a patient to make his own decision was "a
basic human right protected by the common law."2 ' 4 Lord Scarman distin-
guished "advice" and "information" cases from "treatment" and "diagno-
sis" cases and said that in the latter "the court is primarily concerned with a
patient's right." 205 From this his Lordship concluded:
The doctor's duty arises from the patient's rights. If one consid-
ers the scope of the doctor's duty by beginning with the right of the
patient to make his own decision whether he will or will not un-
dergo the treatment proposed, the right to be informed of signifi-
cant risk and the doctor's corresponding duty is easy to understand
206
By concentrating on the patient's right to choose, Lord Scarman was able to
200. Kennedy, supra note 173, at 465.
201. Sidaway [19851 2 W.L.R. at 489-99.
202. Id at 491.
203. Id at 488.
204. Id
205. Id. at 494.
206. Id
1985]
106 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 1:75
direct the doctor's duty to disclose towards a standard judged from a pa-
tient's, and not from a doctor's, point of view.
Ideally, Lord Scarman thought that the standard of disclosure should be
judged by reference to what the particular patient being treated would con-
sider significant, but he said: "I would think that, as a matter of ethics, this
is the test of the doctor's duty. The law, however, operates not in Utopia but
in the world as it is and such an inquiry would prove in practice to be frus-
trated by the subjectivity of its aim and purpose. '20 7 As a result Lord
Scarman approved, as "the next best thing",208 the "prudent patient" test as
being the appropriate one in English law. He held that a doctor was under a
duty to disclose all "real" or "material" risks. A "material" risk was one
which "in the circumstances of the particular case the court is satisfied that a
reasonable person in the patient's position would be likely to attach signifi-
cance to . ,,209
Lord Scarman held that only the existence of the risks inherent in a medi-
cal procedure and the available alternative treatments were matters solely for
professional judgment.210 In determining what was "material" two critical
factors, upon which medical evidence would be necessary, would be the de-
gree of probability of the risk materializing and the seriousness of the possi-
ble injury if it did. 21 1 Although medical evidence could be used to help the
court decide the "materiality" of a risk, this would not pass the standard of
disclosure to the medical profession because "materiality" would have to be
decided on all the evidence including the expert evidence but would be "ulti-
mately legal, not medical in character.,
212
What risks then are material? The answer to this can, of course, only be
given in general terms. Much would depend upon the facts of individual
cases and, in particular, the make-up of the individual patient, because the
"prudent patient" test, although an objective one, takes account of the cir-
cumstances of the individual patient. The degree of probability of the risk
materializing and the seriousness of the injury if it did have already been
seen to be relevant. 213 The purpose of the operation would also be a signifi-
cant factor in the court's determination of what is "material." More risks




210. Id. at 494-95.
; ?211. lId. at 494.
212. Id. at 495.
213. Supra note 124. See also Picard, supra note 156.
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relieving surgery than in life-saving surgery.214 Also Lord Scarman ob-
served that a "prudent patient" would probably not wish to know the risks
which were inherent in any operation, such as the possibility of sepsis, car-
diac arrest, or injury from anaesthetic, but as his Lordship recognized, hav-
ing regard to this particular patient's make-up, it would not be difficult to
imagine a situation where these risks would be "material" ones.2"' On the
other hand, special risks in treatment, instead of the latter more general
risks, would more likely be "material" for the "prudent patient."
Nevertheless, Lord Scarman recognized that in some circumstances a doc-
tor would be justified in not disclosing risks which the "prudent patient" test
would normally require him to disclose. 6 Lord Scarman accepted, and in
fact emphasized, that if a doctor reasonably believed that to disclose a risk
would physically or mentally harm the patient, as opposed to simply in-
crease the chances of the patient refusing the treatment which the doctor
thought appropriate, then the doctor would have a defense in a negligence
action even if the risk ought prima facie to be disclosed according to the
"prudent patient" standard. But proof of this defense, on the basis of expert
evidence of professional practice, would be for the doctor; it would be an
exception to the general rule of disclosure of "material" risks.
In America, this exception has become known as the doctor's "therapeutic
privilege." It is important that the exception be kept within strict bounda-
ries lest, as Professor Kennedy has pointed OUt, 2 17 "the defense can . . .
swallow up the principle", or as the court put it in Canterbury, "it might
devour the disclosure rule itself."21 Lord Scarman identified the "therapeu-
tic exception" as a situation where reasonable professional practice would
accept nondisclosure because it "would be detrimental to [the] patient's
health ' 219 and later his Lordship described such a case as only arising in
"exceptional circumstances. ' 220 It is important that this be the law and not,
as Lord Scarman at one point in his opinion stated, whenever the doctor
"reasonably believed that disclosure of the risk would be . . . contrary to
[the patient's] best interest.,221 Such an approach would be far too wide and
214. Sidaway, [1985] 2 W.L.R. 480. See also White, 120 D.L.R.3d at 283; Videto, 125
D.L.R.3d at 134.
215. Sidaway, [1985] 2 W.L.R. 480. See also White, 120 D.L.R.3d at 283; Videto, 125
D.L.R.3d at 134.
216. Meisel, The Exceptions to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between
Competing Values in Medical Decision Making, 2 Wis. L. REV. 413 (1979).
217. Kennedy, supra note 173, at 466.
218. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788.
219. Sidaway, [1985] 2 W.L.R. 480.
220. Id. at 496.
221. Id. at 494. See also Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 707, 295 A.2d 676 (1972).
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might make the exception the norm. This would undermine the whole tenor
of Lord Scarman's speech, which emphatically supports the "patient's right
to know." The exception should only arise if disclosure would make the
patient "so ill or emotionally distraught. . . as to foreclose a rational deci-
sion ... ,222 If limited to this sort of case the essence of "informed con-
sent" would be retained, namely the desire to ensure the patient has an
opportunity to make a rational choice.
In America other exceptions have been recognized.223 There is no need to
disclose a "material" risk if the patient is incompetent because, for example,
he is unconscious. In this situation "harm from a failure to treat is immi-
nent and outweighs any harm threatened by the proposed treatment
.... "224 Also, if the patient has waived his "right to know" by leaving the
decision to the doctor, nondisclosure will be justified. Lastly, in cases of
emergency the doctor may proceed without disclosing the risks involved.
Certainly the last two exceptions can be seen as autonomy-enhancing and so
do not offend the underlying basis for the "informed consent" doctrine.
Mrs. Sidaway's success in persuading Lord Scarman to embrace in Eng-
lish law the transatlantic "doctrine of informed consent" was short lived as
his Lordship went on to find that it had not been proved that the risk of
damage to the spinal cord had not been disclosed as a "material" risk which
a "prudent patient" would want to know. His Lordship also hinted that had
the surgeon been available at the trial225 he might have been able to establish
the "therapeutic privilege" exception.226
(viii) Answering Questions
One crumb of comfort for patients after Sidaway is that the Law Lords
seemed to agree227 that the position would be different if the patient asked
the doctor about the risks involved in a particular medical procedure. In
such circumstances the doctor would have to answer the questions truthfully
even if he would not normally be under a duty to volunteer the informa-
tion.22' Lord Bridge said: "[W]hen questioned specifically by a patient of
apparently sound mind about risks involved in a particular treatment pro-
posed, the doctor's duty must, in my opinion, be to answer both truthfully
222. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789.
223. See generally, Meisel, supra note 216.
224. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788.
225. He died before the litigation began.
226. Sidaway, [1985] 2 W.L.R. at 495.
227. Id. at 496-507.
228. In F. v. R, 33 S. Austl. St. R. 189 (1985), Bollen, J. required "a completely accurate
answer". Id. at 206. King, C.J. required "full and frank advice" in such cases. Id. at 196.
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and as fully as the questioner requires. '229 The duty to make full disclosure
in response to questions is the converse of the "waiver" exception discussed
earlier.
In the earlier English case of Hatcher v. Black2 3° a different view was
taken. The plaintiff, a part-time broadcaster at the British Broadcasting
Corporation (B.B.C.), went into the hospital to have an operation on her
thyroid gland. She asked the doctors specifically whether there was any risk
to her voice, this being very important to her. She was reassured. The oper-
ation took place, but a nerve was damaged and she could not longer speak
properly. It was argued that the doctors had been negligent in not telling
her of the risk to her voice. Lord Denning23t in his summing-up to the jury
stated:
• . . [The doctor] admitted that on the evening before the opera-
tion he told the plaintiff that there was no risk to her voice, when
he knew that there was some slight risk, but that he did it for her
own good because it was of vital importance that she should not
worry. In short, he told a lie, but he did it because he thought in
the circumstances it was justifiable. If this were a court of morals,
that would raise a nice question . . . . But so far as the law is
concerned, it does not condemn the doctor when he only does that
which many a wise and good doctor so placed would do. It only
condemns him when he falls short of the accepted standards of a
great profession ... 232
In the face of this summing-up the jury found for the defendant.
If the views in Sidaway are followed Lord Denning's statement of the law
is no longer accurate. However, it may be that the correct position is some-
where between the black and white extremes of Hatcher and Sidaway.
As the New Zealand case of Smith v. Auckland Hospital Board2 33 shows,
whatever the duty to disclose is, it will probably be more onerous when a
patient asks questions. That does not mean that necessarily the doctor
should disclose every risk however remote or unlikely.2 34
What if disclosure would be detrimental to the health of the patient?
229. Sidaway, [1985] 2 W.L.R. at 503.
230. The Times (London), June 29, 1954, at 11, col. 4; The Times (London), June 30, 1954,
at 5, col. 4; The Times (London), July 1, 1954, at 6, Col. 1; The Times (London), July 2, 1954,
at 12, col. 4. See also Lord Denning's quotation in THE DISCIPLINE OF THE LAW at 242
(1979).
231. Sitting as a trial judge with a jury.
232. The Times (London), July 1, 1954, at 6, col. 1.
233. [1965) 1 N.Z.L.R. 191.
234. In Videto v. Kennedy, 125 D.L.R.3d 127, 133 (1982) it was stated that the physician
must give "reasonable answers." See also Casey v. Provan, I 1 D.L.R.4th 708 (1985); Smith v.
Auckland Hosp. Board, [1965] 1 N.Z.L.R. 191.
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When the doctor is volunteering information the "reasonable doctor" stan-
dard would almost certainly absolve him from liability in these circum-
stances, as would, of course, the "prudent patient" test because of the
"therapeutic privilege" exception. Why should it be different if the patient
asks questions? Lying may never be ethically permissible; 23 5 nevertheless
legally it may be permissible in circumstances where a severe risk of injury to
the health or mental well-being of the patient exists. 236 It ought, in such
cases, to be lawful to deliberately lie or withhold information even after
Sidaway.
Of course, a fine balance must be held because the "interests of the pa-
tient" provide no sanctuary for a doctor in a battery action and, as we have
seen, fraud or deception can vitiate consent, making such an action available
for the patient.
(ix) Conclusion on Informed Consent
It is unfortunate that the House of Lords did not feel able to adopt the
"doctrine of informed consent." To have recognized this doctrine would not
have been to increase litigation between doctors and patients over what risks
the former disclosed to the latter prior to the medical procedure.237 Instead
the doctrine would have had an educative effect upon the medical profession.
It would have drawn to the medical profession's attention that the doctor-
patient relationship is one of partnership and trust, cemented by joint deci-
sion-making which can only be achieved if the patient is in a position to
enter a dialogue based upon information provided by the doctor. A "doc-
trine of informed consent" would have increased this shared information
and so enhanced the relationship.
The majority of the Law Lords in Sidaway seem to have believed that to
adopt the "prudent patient" test would have been to abrogate clinical judg-
ment. But in reality a mature legal system could easily accommodate this
essential element of a doctor-patient relationship by means of the "therapeu-
tic privilege" exception. The majority's anxiety was misplaced and as a re-
sult their opinions misdirected. Lord Scarman's patient-oriented, as
opposed to doctor-orientated, opinion will, unfortunately, only be a dissent
for legal historians to ponder over. In England, there is no safe harbour for
235. See generally, S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE, ch.
XV (1978).
236. P. SKEGG, LAW, ETHICS AND MEDICINE: STUDIES IN MEDICAL LAW ().
237. In the United States "[t]he number of successful claims [for lack of informed consent]
appears to be relatively small." A national survey for claims in 1975-76 showed that only in
three percent of all cases was informed consent an issue. 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECI-
SIONS, supra note 131, at 21.
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the transatlantic crossing of the "doctrine of informed consent." The rea-
sons why the court has rejected it are probably the same as the reasons for
their protective attitude in treatment and diagnosis cases238 and it is to this
which we must now turn.
IV. POLICY
The reluctance of the English courts to find a doctor negligent undoubt-
edly has its roots in policy considerations. Protection of doctors is seen as
essential to ensure that their primary role of treating their patients is not
interfered with. The threat of "defensive medicine" with all its perceived
inhibiting qualities for doctors and the practice of medicine looms large in
the minds of the judiciary239 and steers them towards a conservative view of
the liability of doctors. As Lord Denning said in 1954 in Hatcher v. Black:
[A] doctor examining a patient, or a surgeon operating at a ta-
ble, instead of getting on with his work would be forever looking
over his shoulder to see if someone was coming up with a dagger
- for an action in negligence against a doctor is for him like unto a
dagger. 2 °
"Defensive medicine" may be a myth or a reality in America. It is argua-
bly the latter, generated not as a result of legal attitudes but by medical ones.
In any event, as Professor Kennedy says, "one doctor's defensive medicine
may well be another's idea of good practice. In other words, it may simply
be a term to describe that kind of careful medicine which ought to be prac-
ticed, but some find irksome."
'241
The hallmark of this form of medicine is, as the Pearson Commission
pointed out, that doctors "in an attempt to avoid litigation . . . include in
their treatment costly tests and X-rays which are not necessary for treating
the patient. ' '242 In a medical system where treatment is paid for by the con-
sumer-patient an increase in tests results directly in an increase in fees, both
for the doctor initially carrying' out the procedure and the other specialist
doctors who are called in to carry out additional tests. This, as much as the
fear of the law court, has probably contributed to "defensive medicine" in
the United States. In England, where the health care system is centrally
,238. For a possible additional reason, see Schwartz & Grubb, Why Britain Can't Afford
Informed Consent, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP. (1985).
239. See, e.g., Sidway, [1985] 2 W.L.R. 480. See also Dunn, L. J., in the same case in the
Court of Appeals, [1984] 1 Q.B. at 518.
240. The Times (London), July 1, 1954, at 6, col. 1.
241. Kennedy, supra note 173, at 469.
242. THE PEARSON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, 1319, at 283.
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funded and doctors are paid a salary for the skills they exercise, multiplica-
tion of tests does not result in extra income for them.
A number of other factors suggest that the fear of "defensive medicine" in
England is ill-founded.243 First, the American disease of malpractice claims
is to a great extent caused by the existence of lawyers' "contingency fees", as
a result of which the lawyer representing a plaintiff takes a share of the dam-
ages awarded, usually between thirty and fifty per cent, but nothing if the
action is unsuccessful. This undoubtedly increases the number of specula-
tive claims brought against doctors, many of which have little real chance of
success. 2" In England the practice of charging "contingency fees" is both
professionally unethical and, although no longer criminal,245 unlawful as be-
ing contrary to public policy. 2' Therefore, this element in the "defensive
medicine" equation will not be present.
In America, a medical malpractice claim is tried before a jury. In Eng-
land, apart from a few exceptions,247 civil claims are tried by judges sitting
alone. In America juries award enormous damages, often exceeding one mil-
lion dollars, whilst in England the highest award, in this sort of case, is no-
where near that figure.24 The jury system and the huge awards of damages
that await a successful medical malpractice plaintiff are a significant entice-
ment to sue a doctor.249 In England this would not arise to anything like
such an extent. The Pearson Commission concluded "[w]e do not think that
we need fear in this country a problem of American proportions.,
250
It is not just the judges' attitude to medical malpractice cases which makes
it difficult to sue doctors. Society has an aversion to suing doctors because of
the attitude towards providers of health care. Doctors in England are not
seen as fair game for litigation, unlike their American counterparts. In Eng-
land the doctor is seen as the health "guru" whose judgment is rarely to be
questioned. The doctor is placed on a pedestal by the patient and required to
243. See S. MCLEAN & G. MAHER, MEDICINE, MORALS AND THE LAW, 164-67 (1983).
244. See the remarks of Lord Scarman in Sidaway, [1985] 2 W.L.R. at 493. See also THE
PEARSON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, 1320, at 283.
245. The offense of "maintenance", including "champery", which the charging of contin-
gency fees would amount to, was abolished by the Criminal Law Act, 1967, § 18(1) and §
14(1).
246. See Wallersteiner v. Moir (No. 2), [1975] 1 Q.B. 373, 394, Trendtex Trading Corp. v.
Credit Suisse (No. 1), [1982] 1 Q.B. 629, 654, (Lord Denning M.R.).
247. There is a right to a jury trial in cases of fraud, libel, slander, malicious prosecution
and false imprisonment: see Supreme Court Act, 1981, § 69(1). In other cases a judge will sit
alone, although there is some discretion in allowing a jury: see Supreme Court Act, 1981,
§ 69(3).
248. See KEMP & KEMP, THE QUANTUM OF DAMAGES (4th ed.) ().
249. THE PEARSON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, 1 1319, 1323, at 283.
250. Id. $ 1324, at 283.
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hand down decisions and treatment to the duly worshipful recipient. When
things go wrong the resulting injury is invariably seen by the patient as a
mishap and there is little inclination to direct blame at the doctor and seek
compensation from him.
By contrast in the United States where health care is paid for by the pa-
tient, albeit through insurance, the patient is perceived as being in a partner-
ship with the doctor who is the provider of a service with the patient as the
consumer, expecting all the rights that a consumer would normally have if
he received shoddy goods. Patients in the United States have different expec-
tations of their relationship with their doctors and of "medicine's capabilities
and [have] aired their disappointments in courts."'251 In short, in the United
States there is no built-in inhibition to litigate against a doctor whose treat-
ment has caused injury.
However, the reason for the courts' approach to medical malpractice cases
probably goes deeper than this and is, at least in part, based upon the com-
mon professional affinity of doctors and lawyers in England. In England,
the judges are more respectful of professional competence than are Ameri-
can counterparts. Lawyers and doctors see themselves as professional
equals. As a result judges are less inclined to label doctors' actions negli-
gent. Typical of this approach is that of Lord Denning in Hucks v. Cole,2 2
where his Lordship said: "A charge of professional negligence against a
medical man was serious. It stood on a different footing to a charge of negli-
gence against a driver of a motor car. The consequences were far more seri-
ous. It affected his professional status and reputation." '253
It is very questionable whether all or any of these factors which have influ-
enced the courts should make it more difficult for patients to sue doctors for
wrong diagnosis, treatment, or advice. The courts' predisposition towards
the medical profession can no longer be justified and does not reflect soci-
ety's present attitude. As the Pearson Commission observed, "[t]he public
attitude towards litigation is changing. . . . ,254 Equally the public attitude
to the doctor-patient relationship is changing in keeping with the modem
trend of "consumerism." The assumed perception of the doctor as health
care provider in our lives has changed from a relationship of paternalistic
dominance to one which is more consumer orientated, an attitude likely to
be reinforced in the future.255 Paternalism was more appropriate to a by-
gone age when the population were presumed to be uneducated and there-
251. Id. 1320, at 283.
252. The Times (London), May 9, 1968, at 5, col. 4.
253. THE PEARSON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, 1322, at 283.
254. See generally, 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 131.
255. Added footnote here to balance with text.
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fore incapable of playing an equal role in the doctor-patient relationship.
Such a view has no foundation in our present society and consequently does
not have any right to be reflected in our legal system.
